Moral Realists should be beheaded

the case for an intersubjective honor framework

You can’t derive an Ought from an Is.

Nonetheless, we continue to share oxygen with folx who claim to perceive binding and mind-independent facts about how everyone must behave, and treat disagreement with such claims as a defect in anyone who disagrees.

This essay argues that such people—Moral Realists—should be subject to summary execution by guillotine, and that the space they currently occupy in the public square should be filled instead by an intersubjective honor framework based on reciprocity, reputation, and concentric circles of duty-bonds negotiated entirely in the open by parties who admit very overtly what they want.

The empirical picture from moral psychology couldn’t be clearer: peepo’s moral intuitions vary systematically with temperament, and sensitivity to things like purity, “fairness,” and loyalty all are downstream of deeply heritable traits that can be tracked and measured and predicted long before some reedy Jew from San Fran shows up to make an Argument.

And that’s the operative point here—the felt certainty of something being “wrong” basically always arrives precognitively, as a somatic event, whether it’s a flash of disgust, a fight-or-flight response, or an amygdalic jolt of contempt for the outgroup or defeated rival. Logos is but a means to an end; a vehicle for backsolving towards a Reason that endows said jolt with a dignified pedigree.

Now obviously all this is highly adaptive; what we call “consciousness” exists from an evolutionary standpoint mostly to A) coordinate hunting parties / warbands and their institutional descendants; B) maintain a diachronically bounded self-story through time that facilitates long-term planning and higher-order goal formation; and C) allow peepo to more easily dehumanize strategic obstacles by refracting feelings of hatred and disgust and fear through moralized language that transmogrifies tedious stories of Grug vs. Blug into stories of Blug being Bad that make it easier to convince your cousins to help you go smash Blug’s head against the cavewall so you can take his berries and enjoy his wife and daughters together.

Internalized normativity is part of the coordinative toolkit, because as a rule one’s amygdalic chimpouts cannot by themselves convince a psychologically normal guy to jab a pike through someone’s nose or throw the first torch or yeet that baby in a well.

But a principle can.

And so the mind erects whole cathedrals of metaphysics around its vulgar Pleistocene nigger-impulses and then, crucially, forgets it built them.

Now, womyn generally experience this forgetfulness via consequentialist epistemics that prioritize speaker status and the stability of extant power dynamics as operative truth condition over clean mechanistic correspondence, because women are relational and affective creatures not causally embedded in peepos’ life narratives in any way that lets them be held accountable for their actions, which is just one reason among many we menfolk find their pink little pussies so scrumptious; babygirl doesn’t really need to be Right about how the universe works per se, just feel Right in a way that makes her cooter taste good, which generally means maintaining a Pure self-concept whilst viciously dehumanizing any dead branches that need to be incinerated lest they restrict her optionality in mate choice and therefore her ability to keep the tribe from degenerating into a bunch of retarded hunchbacks who act like John Arcto.

The normalfag male, meanwhile, will experience normativity more selectively, and in basically all cases it will come down to Reasons why he should get more stuff / pussy and be seen as more coo, because men are pursuers instead of selectors which means for the normie male “morality” is less about eugenics than about laundering material appetite and status grievance in a way that gives him psychological momentum to not take Foids at face value when they gargle the strongest horse’s jissum and instead persist until HE’S the strong horse and said Foids are munching his cum instead.

That or just Die—in most cases it’s always been Die because men are the dice roll sex; bitches side eye you until your Weird rudolph the red nose reindeer mutation is useful enough that Donner becomes the incel and your tale goes down in song and story.

Thus for the hotdog male anything that reduces his own material / status position or makes bitches think he’s not coo will be experienced viscerally as Evil and Bad in the same way womyn treat Muh Vagina as a truth condition over clean correspondence, and if you ever try to subjectivize it he’ll experience a disgust reaction at you staring at the Imperial Micropenis and probably say you’re “obsessed with status” while doing the Pete Davidson side-eye around girls hoping they’ll epistemically foreclose you, or if he’s less cunning just call you Jewish or a pedophile or w/e.

But long story short: morality is a coordinative social technology for Dunbar-sized tribal bands that functions mainly by refracting feelings of disgust borne of physical / social / genetic contamination risk, threat perception, and outgroup hostility, and has an intractably adversarial sexed component that functionally operates in both sexes mostly through strong horse worship and saying you never backed Marius after Sulla’s army marches into the city, though men are generally a bit more conscious of their wormy asslicking than women, and only spergs see everything in a purely mechanistic light that doesn’t reflect embodied normativity—a trait inarguably to our detriment.

Everyone but the sperg is existing in a state of Adaptive Forgetting.

The Moral Realist has systematized this forgetting into a formal philosophical stance that takes the output of his own neurotype—his own particular calibration of disgust, threat, and tribal attachment—and promotes that calibration to the status of universal law, such that every temperament unlike his own becomes not just a different constitution but an error of fact experienced as permitting extraordinary enforcement measures against offending neurotypes / cultures whose downstream behavior the Moral Realist will Germanically de-essentialize as a matter of “free will.”

But if you’re not a huge faggot it should be very obvious to you that this isn’t any different in principle from doing the same thing to e.g. black people or gays.

The Moral Realist is saying that the way his own nervous system moralizes shit is the way all nervous systems ought to, and that any variance is “objectively” depraved.

And this sort of person, it turns out, very quickly becomes untrustworthy.

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A complex society is a negotiation among parties with different moral foundations and genuinely conflicting material interests: doctors and insurers, urban and rural, high-openness and high-conscientiousness—each faction will see its own sectoral interest, very tediously, through a moral lens, because that is what said lens is for.

The workable response to this condition, of course, is transactional: identify what each party wants, establish terms, build reputations for keeping them, and implement some mutually agreeable enforcement regime to punish defection.

This is not “morality” as such, but rather a game-theoretic honor framework. It asks nothing of anyone except reliability, and also scales because it doesn’t require parties involved to share metaphysical commitments that will NEVER NOT break down by religion and ideology and subculture in any late modern democratic capitalist society.

But the Moral Realist wrecks this machinery in four interconnected ways.

• First, he removes his own demands from the table; a negotiator states a price, but the Moral Realist instead just gesticulates incoherently at “truth.” And truths, of course, can’t be haggled over, which means each and every realist demand arrives pre-hardened and non-negotiable in principle, such that what would otherwise be a solvable conflict of interest is now a battle between righteousness and error.

• Second, he launders appetite. Because realism forbids saying “I want this,” every material interest and status ambition must now be smuggled through tedious obscurantist obligation-talk. Thus the physician defending his grotesquely high salary miraculously discovers he deserves it, while the clique seeking power discovers justice requires its ascendancy. Realism is the perfect solvent for candor, because it converts every cynical grab into a Duty while making the grabber sincerely unable to see his own hand moving. And an honest counterparty cannot negotiate with someone who has hidden his interests even from himself.

• Third, he converts status jockeying into moral standing. In a Realist ecology, the currency of prestige is visible righteousness, which means the cheapest route to esteem is condemnation; one acquires standing by policing, by detecting heresy in others, and by performing woundedness. This selects for exactly the behavior an honor system punishes: the toothless accuser without any skin in the game who risks nothing, produces nothing, and harvests esteem by ankle-biting anyone who does. And observe also that heterodox movements and productive coalitions alike are routinely destroyed from within by this dynamic—envy and resentment given a moralistic pretext and thereby made unanswerable through any means but Aristocratic Contempt, which of course through equilibriation then functionally becomes so ubiquitous as to serve as the chief set of elite and elite-aspirational norms in frictionless late modern social ecologies. And note that for the weak and powerless, aristocratic contempt alloyed to plausible deniability / photonegative status games is a far direr species of oppression than premodern honor culture.

• Fourth, he escalates ingroup-outgroup policing to its logical Schmittian terminus. The honor framework permits you to regard someone as an adversary while still dealing with them honestly; you are on opposite sides, and both of you know it, yet terms are possible and very likely. But Moral Realism forecloses this, because if my moral perceptions are perceptions of fact, then anyone who rejects them is not just an adversary but defective, and the appropriate posture toward defectives is not negotiation but treatment, containment, or destruction. Thus dehumanization stops being a regrettable wartime measure and becomes an epistemic obligation.

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The Retard’s Objections

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LOL U SAID “SHOULD” — GOTCHA!

Usually in these discussions the realist’s first riposte is to suggest that any argument against realism must itself smuggle in realist assumptions, such that by e.g. uttering that Moral Realists should have their heads cut off, the anti-realist commits himself to the same normativity he denies.

But this is asinine, and its asininity is instructive, because the objection only lands provided every “should” is a truth-apt proposition about mind-independent normative reality, which of course is precisely the claim under dispute.

Within an intersubjective framework, an ought-utterance is understood by both speaker and audience as a coordinative and persuasive act—rallying cry, risky text, bid for feet pics, statement of association, or threat about consequences.

Thus when I say “Moral Realists should have their heads cut off,” I am not reporting any fact I’ve purportedly detected in the normative firmament; I’m openly and overtly recruiting or proposing terms or applying pressure. The utterance wears its function on its sleeve, but the Moral Realist hears a proposition because propositions are all his framework allows him to hear and then fart-sniffingly praises himself for “catching me in a contradiction” that exists only inside his fake and gay little spook-universe.

But the truth, of course, is that everything eventually bottoms out in some species of implied ad baculum; the intersubjectivist merely declines to lie about it.

You’re just recreating morality!

This second objection observes that an honor framework entails duties, sanctions, and evaluations, and concludes from this it’s just morality in a Guy Fawkes mask.

But the putative resemblance is superficial while the difference is total, as said difference lies in what the system claims about its own foundations.

To wit, the honor framework proceeds very overtly from facts that Moral Realism must suppress: that participants have divergent neurotypes, that they are moved by material appetite and status hunger, and that their evaluations are expressions of these things.

Its duties radiate outward through concentric circles of relational proximity—children, spouse, kin, friends, tribe, nation—because that is how human loyalty felt on a visceral somatic level is ackshully experienced in practice, and it treats dealings beyond those circles as a repeated game of reciprocity and reputation, because that is what such dealings ackshully amount to operatively speaking.

Nothing in it purports to bind a stranger who never agreed to it.

And a legal contract is not a recreation of divine command merely because both involve obligation; the entirety of the difference is that one party admits the obligation was constructed by interested parties, and the other insists it fell from the sky.

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Death is not an arbitrary punishment bolted onto this argument; it is any functioning honor framework’s native enforcement mechanism, and the Moral Realist has merited its application by the framework’s own lights.

The cardinal defection in any reputation economy is negotiating in bad faith—misrepresenting your interests, disguising compulsion as description, treating counterparties as objects to be corrected rather than parties to be dealt with. And it turns out the Moral Realist commits this defection structurally and by necessity every time he speaks, because it’s all his framework consists of. He is less a bad actor within the game than a repudiation of the game itself—a player who knocks over the board and rips the instructions in two insisting we play under the rules used at his house

An honorable man can deal with an open enemy; he can deal with a rival, a hard bargainer, and even a member of a hostile tribe, because all of these things can be modeled, and terms with them persist diachronically through time purely on the basis of self-interest. What he cannot deal with is the man who’s fused his own appetite and status interests to the fabric of the cosmos and thus experiences every negotiation as blasphemy. Such men are uniquely dangerous to society precisely because they’re sincere: their manipulation runs through their own self-model first, which mean it arrives at the gates with the full force of conviction and none of the tells of normal deceit.

Now the moralizer will either call all of the above Jewish, or say something in the neighborhood of Muh Vagina (which is an acceptable response and should be addressed by blowing her out very vigorously until she stops being a Faggot), or Petedavidsonly side-eye the anti-realist in the direction of someone they perceive as likely to say Muh Vagina hoping it will contaminate the anti-realist’s status position enough to epistemically foreclose him in any relevant theaters of debate.

But they’re never—and I do mean Never here, so don’t believe their gay Taqiyya—going to engage you in good faith about any of this or operate under any frame not tainted by normalfag amygdala-chimpouts / pussthought.

They aren’t offering you anything resembling a fair fight, so do not engage them as such.

Instead ask the Moral Realist what he wants and what he is offering, and if he insists that he wants nothing and merely serves The Trvth, treat him as you would treat any other counterparty who refuses to disclose his interests.

That is to say, as a Schmittian Outgroup with whom no deal can safely be made.